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Abstract
Relying on situational crime prevention perspective, this study compares successful and unsuccessful pirate attacks
reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) from the year 2000 through 2013 (n = 4,902). The study builds
upon the recent work of Shane and Magnuson in Justice Quarterly, pp 1–26 (2014), which found various SCP techniques effectively prevented piracy attacks on a global level. The current study builds upon these findings by testing
whether the global effect of SCP is consistent across individual continents. A series of mixed-effects logistic regression models and follow-up likelihood ratio tests were incorporated to explore the research question. In each model,
SCP techniques were associated with unsuccessful piracy attacks on a global level. When considered individually, SCP
techniques were equally effective in each continent. However, the use of multiple techniques classified within the
increased effort technique of SCP was associated with increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks in only 3 (South East
Asia, Far East, and Rest of the World) of the 6 continents included in this study. The implications of these findings are
discussed.
Keywords: Piracy, Opportunity, Shipping industry, Situational crime prevention, Logistic regression, Vessel security
Background
Piracy reports from the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB) reveal that actual and attempted attacks against
ships worldwide have increased 129% between 1991 and
2014, with large spikes between 2000–2003 and 2009–
2011 (IMB 2014a). Although some downward trends
began in 2011, led primarily by reductions around the
Straits of Malacca, piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to escalate mostly off the coast of Somalia, Tanzania
and around the Gulf of Aden (Prins 2014) with sustained
rates of violence. The IMB recently reported that attacks
against small tankers around the coast of Southeast Asia
were responsible for a 75% increase in global ship hijackings between 2013 and 2014 (IMB 2014b).
Piracy continues to pose a threat to the world’s economic interests particularly in the Horn of Africa region
(Bowden 2010; Salopek 2013; US National Security
Council 2014 p. 4) and is largely driven by macro-level
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land-based social disorganization (Fund For Peace 2014)
that facilitates crime and corruption, which enables
piracy (Ho 2009; Middleton 2008). United States foreign
policy in this region is based largely on a strategy of limited coalition and multinational agreements that address
piracy; a permanent solution will require a sustained
long-term international effort that includes diplomatic,
economic, social, military, intelligence, law enforcement and judicial intervention (De Montclos 2012; Otto
2011; US National Security Council 2014; van Ginkel and
Landman 2012).
The shipping industry cannot wait for these political
and law enforcement measures to materialize to reduce
piracy and improve safety. The international law enforcement community is not necessarily well suited to address
piracy, particularly when dealing with states that are at
risk of failure (Forsyth et al. 2009, p. 672; also see Murphy 2008, 2009). This is complicated by legal constraints
(Chalk 2010; Gill 1996; Hawkins 2009; Kraska and Wilson
2011; Murphy 2011; Sterio 2011) and delays associated
with defining and codifying piracy, wrangling diplomatic
efforts, financing prosecutions, crafting international
agreements and establishing legal jurisdiction (Fokas
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1997; Hong and Ng 2010). Although a long-term strategy is important to regional stability, the daily approach
to address piracy requires a tactical effort that can be
applied when vessels are threatened. The world’s oceans
are vast, remote, unassigned spaces (Felson 1994) that
make piracy easier to perpetrate, harder to detect and
prevent, but not inevitable. There are methods that
merchant marines and their vessels can employ to protect themselves that alter the transit environment and
their immediate situational perspective before an attack
and while an attack is underway. The situational crime
prevention (SCP) approach is informed by analysis that
focuses on the crime, not the criminal. It values prevention over arrest and empowers the individual over the
government to construct a safer environment when traditional law enforcement or military resources are not
available (Clarke 1997; Goldstein 1979).
Most previous studies analyze piracy from a descriptive or macro-level perspective, which is too generalized to offer substantive crime prevention measures (e.g.,
Psarros et al. 2011; Wong and Tsz Leung 2012). SCP is
a micro-level approach with a wide body of research
touting its crime control benefits (e.g., Clarke 1997). An
emerging body of research now extends SCP techniques
to piracy with promising results (Bryant et al. 2014;
Shane and Magnuson 2014). The present study aims
to widen the SCP literature by testing whether the SCP
techniques found in previous piracy studies are equally
effective across different regions of the world.

Literature review
The current literature on piracy mainly lacks a criminological perspective (Twyman-Ghoshal 2014) and is
largely focused on describing its frequency and nature
in terms of trends and patterns such as those around
the Singapore Strait and South China Sea (Von Hoesslin
2012), Nigeria (De Montclos 2012), Southeast Asia and
Africa (Jeong 2015). Other studies examine the types of
vessels most often attacked along with the weapons used
(Sullivan 2010), as well as attacks that cluster in time
and space (Talley and Rule 2008; Townsley and Oliverira
2012; Marchione and Johnson 2013).
Piracy varies by region in terms of frequency, violence,
distance from the shore, time of day and the ship’s position (Nincic 2009; Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014).
Southeast Asia experienced the highest number of pirate
attacks compared to other regions in the 1990’s (Chalk
1998; Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014), particularly
near the Singapore Straits, the Malacca Straits and Indonesia (Beckman 2002). By comparison, piracy around
Africa remained constant between 2001 and 2006, then
increased after 2006 (Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014)
with Nigeria and Somalia experiencing the most attacks
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(Nincic 2009). Von Hoesslin (2012) notes that while most
pirate attacks in Southeast Asia occur close to shore,
more are occurring further out at sea. This trend has
yet to be observed off of the Indian subcontinent, where
attacks primarily occur in local waters (Twyman-Ghoshal
and Pierce 2014).
Pirate tactics, strategies and level of organization also
vary by region (Nincic 2009; Davenport 2012). Although
Nigerian pirates focus on oil tankers (Jeong 2015), Somali
pirates prefer ransom through kidnapping and pirates in
Southeast Asia focus on opportunistic theft when ships
are at anchor or berth (Beckman 2002; Nincic 2009;
Ploch et al. 2011; Davenport 2012). Pirates operating
around the Indian subcontinent are motivated by theft
(Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014) and attacks around
Bangladesh and India were found to mostly occur on stationary vessels, while pirates in Indonesia attacked both
moving and stationary ships equally (Twyman-Ghoshal
and Pierce 2014).
Pirates are also more sophisticated and organized
around Southeast Asia compared to East Africa because
failed states (e.g., Somalia) hamper the pirates’ ability to create complex networks (Hastings 2009). Pirates
in Africa tend to be armed with more advanced weapons (e.g., guns, rocket-propelled grenades) compared
to pirates in Southeast Asia who are usually armed
with knives and crowbars (Nincic 2009; Sullivan 2010;
Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014). Unlike African and
Southeast Asian pirates, Indian pirates are rarely armed
(Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014). Although African pirates are more likely to become violent compared
to pirates in Southeast Asia (Nincic 2009; Von Hoesslin
2012), Sullivan (2010) and Ploch et al. (2011) note that
most Somali pirates do not kill their victims since their
goal is ransom.
Adding to the complexity of different types of piracy
and pirate groups is the notion that piracy itself is
an evolving phenomenon (Dua and Menkhaus 2012;
Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014; Sörenson and Widen
2014). The changing nature of piracy can be seen in Von
Hoesslin’s (2012) research indicating that sophisticated
and organized groups operating in the Singapore Strait
and the South China Sea have adapted to anti-piracy
measures implemented by government and law enforcement. This is yet another example of why shipmasters
cannot rely on traditional government and law enforcement for protection.
From the offender’s perspective, several studies suggest
the primary motivation behind piracy is money (O’Meara
2007; Chalk 2009; Hansen 2012; Gjelsvik and Bjørgo
2012), with economic conditions being a main contributing factor (Vagg 1995; Clark 2009; Onuoha 2009; Von
Hoesslin 2012). An important piece of the equation that
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is missing from previous studies is opportunity, which
is present in all crime (Felson and Clarke 1998) and is a
contributing factor in piracy. Understanding how opportunity arises in the piracy context is most complete when
examined through a situational crime prevention lens,
which accounts for the victim, the offender and the environmental influences. The overwhelming majority of
previous studies stop short of offering specific measures
to prevent piracy and do not account for immediate situational perspective that influences the pirates’ decision to
attack.

Theoretical framework
Situational crime prevention

Situational crime prevention is particularly relevant
to piracy, since it assists in identifying measures that
are effective in disrupting the opportunity for an attack
(Clarke 1980, 1997, 2013). SCP is informed by the three
separate theories of environmental criminology, which,
when taken together, amount to “opportunity theory:”
routine activities (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson and
Cohen 1980), crime pattern (Brantingham and Brantingham 1975, 1984, 1993), and rational choice (Cornish and
Clarke 1986). Fundamental to environmental criminology is the disruption of crime opportunities by manipulating or altering the environment. Opportunities arise
when a suitable target (vessel), converges in time and
space with a motivated offender (pirate) in the absence of
a capable guardian (crew or other authority) (Cohen and
Felson 1979). This represents the interaction between
an offender and their environment, which is a departure
from the traditional “dispositional” theories of crime and
criminality (e.g., Cullen and Agnew 2006). An offender’s
disposition (i.e., motivation) is a constant in the crime
equation, so understanding the characteristics of the target (those that make it more or less attractive) and the
environment (those facilitate or inhibit the offender’s
actions) is where SCP begins to take shape.
Unique to SCP when compared to traditional criminological theories is its focus on proximate situational
factors contributing to a crime, as well as its focus on
specific forms of crime (Clarke 1995, 1997, 2013). There
is a seemingly infinite supply of motivating factors some
of which can be controlled by society, but which cannot
necessarily be controlled as an attack begins. As such,
SCP theory concentrates on controlling the immediate
situational environment and preparing for an offender’s
overt attempt to seize control of the target. When viewed
from this perspective it is easier to design crime prevention measures that focus on disrupting the convergence
setting than it is to shape the range of social problems
that affect someone’s personal circumstance.
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Manipulating physical and environmental temptations resides with “controllers:” (1) capable guardians
who can alert authorities or physically intervene to stop
the offender; (2) intimate handlers who personally know
the offender or who know them by proxy and can exert
control over their actions and (3) managers who have
responsibility for controlling behavior and environmental conditions at specific places (Felson 1995). Cornish
and Clarke (2003) developed a classification system of 25
situational techniques organized around five categories
(increasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the
rewards, reducing provocations, removing excuses) that
controllers can employ to block opportunities for crime
to occur. The core focus is to mobilize public, private
and non-profit resources that are in a position to systematically alter the immediate environment, which makes a
successful attack less likely (Clarke 1980, 1997).
Perpetrating a successful crime partly depends on the
offender’s calculus about the amount of effort and risk
required, as well as the potential reward. Consequently,
actions taken by prospective victims can influence the
opportunity for crime by manipulating certain aspects
of their immediate environment so the crime is harder
to commit, or the eventual rewards are denied. There is
strong empirical support for SCP across several forms
of crime and delinquency (Clarke 1997). While early
studies focused on traditional land-based crime (e.g.
burglary, motor vehicle theft, alcohol violence, poaching and wildlife crimes), Shane and Magnuson (2014)
recently applied the theoretical framework to piracy.
In that study, the authors found that when a ship’s crew
takes proactive self-protective measures that increase
the perceived effort and increase the perceived risk of
perpetrating an attack, unsuccessful attacks are significantly more likely after controlling for environmental
influences. The bivariate analyses revealed support for
SCP theory, in that certain crime prevention techniques
were significantly associated with unsuccessful attacks. In
substantive terms this suggests that unsuccessful attacks
tend to increase where each of the predictor variables are
more pronounced. The authors extended the bivariate
model further by creating a composite index for increasing perceived risk (raising alarm, anti-piracy watch, private security, watchman present, increasing lighting) and
increasing perceived effort (electric perimeter fencing,
evasive maneuvers, increasing ship speed) and found a
significant positive relationship with a moderate effect
size, where an increase in the composite scores was
associated with an increase in unsuccessful attacks. The
multivariate model also supported SCP theory; as the
presence of SCP factors increased, so did the likelihood
of an unsuccessful attack and the full model accounted
for 41.5% of the variance in the outcome variable.
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Situational crime prevention and piracy

Prior research suggests that three SCP techniques are particularly salient in preventing maritime piracy: Increasing the Perceived Effort to Commit Piracy, Increasing the
Perceived Risk to Commit Piracy, and Reducing the Anticipated Rewards of Piracy. Increasing the perceived effort
means controlling access to places where offenders do
not belong by erecting real and symbolic barriers that signal a given area is restricted (Guerette and Clarke 2003;
Landes 1978; Loomis et al. 2002; Sherman and Rogan
1995; Wallis and Ford 1980). Rengelink (2012) extended
this to the piracy environment and found the most effective measures included increasing the ship’s speed, engaging in evasive maneuvers and deploying a “sonic gun” (to
deflect offenders) (see BBC 2007). Deflecting offenders
disrupts the convergence setting and has also been shown
to reduce gang homicides and assaults (Lasley 1998) and
robberies (Poyner 1994). A separate study examined the
layering effect of SCP measures and found that pirates did
not board vessels when at least four SCP measures were
employed (Twyman-Ghoshal and Pierce 2014).
Increasing the perceived risk means increasing the
chance of being apprehended or identified, which means
raising the prospect the pirates will be seen by someone who can take affirmative action (e.g. the crew, port
employees, local authorities) to prevent the attack. Perceived risk involves a cost-benefit calculation by the
offender based on the qualities of the target that make it
more or less suitable for attack (Felson and Clarke 1998,
p. 54–55). By deliberately augmenting employee surveillance (e.g. lighting, warning alarms), increasing guardianship (e.g. watchmen) and assigning specific on-board
activities (e.g. antipiracy watch, shipboard security), a
shipmaster can maximize visibility that leaves pirates
sensing increased crew vigilance, which has been supported by previous research in other areas (Braga et al.
1999; Clifton 1993). Rengelink (2012) found that naval
force intervention was an effective measure of increasing guardianship that reduced piracy. An alert crew (e.g.,
watchmen) was also found to be an effective deterrent to
piracy (Forsyth et al. 2009); in fact, one study found that
when keeping watch and enhanced vigilance were used
together with at least two other protective measures, the
chances of disrupting a pirate attack greatly increased
(Bryant et al. 2014).
Reducing anticipated rewards means removing the
target from contact with the offender. If the target is not
available, then there is little temptation to continue pursuing the crime. In many instances it is the ship’s crew
and not the ship or the cargo that tempts the attack, since
holding the crew hostage may yield substantial ransom.
If the crew is mustered to a safe room,a then access is
denied. This removes the object of the attack and may
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instigate pirates to retreat from their assault. Denying
pirates the benefit of kidnapping or taking the crew hostage when they board is similar to removing a domestic
violence victim to a safe house to avoid an attack (Storey
et al. 2014), but this is speculative since evaluating safe
rooms aboard ships has yet to be studied.

The present study
In this study we build upon Shane and Magnuson (2014)
in two ways. First, we incorporate an additional year of
data (2013) to further test the effect of SCP on attempted
piracy attacks. Second, we examine whether SCP techniques hold across continents given the variety of piracy
worldwide among developing countries. Given local factors, SCP techniques may not be equally effective around
the globe, but may be more or less effective depending on
contextual factors of the pirates, ship crews, and/or settings of the individual continent. We create a series of
individual and aggregate analyses to test whether situational crime prevention techniques are equally effective
in preventing attacks across continents.
Methodology
Data and descriptive statistics

Data were acquired from publically available reports of
the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (n = 4,902). Data from
2000 to 2009 were collected by Coggins (2012), while
Shane and Magnuson (2014) and the authors collected
the remainder. The IMB follows the definition of Piracy
provided in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.b The unit of analysis is
pirate attacks reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. Variables in the analysis were coded from questions
published in the Live Piracy Report. Coding followed
the schema developed by Shane and Magnuson (2014).
The dependent variable is binary measuring whether the
attack was unsuccessful (1) or successful (0). An unsuccessful attack refers to any piracy attempt resulting in “(1)
approaching a ship but not boarding or (2) boarding a
ship but leaving without any proceeds” while successful
attacks refer to piracy attempts resulting in “(1) hijacking, (2) ransom, or (3) theft” (Shane and Magnuson 2014,
p. 8). In total, nine predictor variables measure the use
of SCP techniques by the ship’s crew during the attack.
Five predictor variables are classified according to the
increasing the perceived risk category of SCP: the use of
anti-piracy watch, the presence of private security personnel, raising the alarm, the presence of watchmen, and
increased lighting. Four predictor variables are classified
according to the increasing the perceived effort category
of SCP: electric perimeter fencing, evasive maneuvers,
increasing speed, and mustering the crew in a fortified
safe room aboard the ship.c Each of these variables is
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operationalized as a binary value, measuring its presence
(1) or absence (0). To measure the totality of SCP techniques employed by the ship’s crew, two continuous variables were created. The first, Increase Risk Index, is the
sum of the five aforementioned increase risk variables.
The second, Increase Effort Index, is the sum of the four
aforementioned increase effort variables. In addition to
the predictor variables, the analysis incorporates six control variables to account for factors that may exert influence over the outcome of an attack, specifically time of
day, quarter of the year, the ship’s attack status (stationary vs. steaming), type of vessel, the number of pirates,
and the presence of weapons (i.e., armed pirates).
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. About half
of the attacks (n = 2,351; 49.4%) were unsuccessful. The Increase Risk Index shows that in nearly half of
the incidents (n = 2,180; 47.9%) the ship’s crew did not
incorporate any SCP techniques meant to increase the
perceived risk of piracy. When such techniques were
used, they were most often raising the alarm (n = 1,917)
and the presence of watchmen (n = 1,241). Increased
lighting (n = 206), private security (n = 265), and antipiracy watches (n = 307) were employed with much
less frequently. During approximately 25% of incidents
(n = 1,138) the crew used multiple increase risk techniques. Approximately 70% of incidents (n = 3,207) did
not involve the use of any increase effort tactics. The most
commonly employed increase effort tactic was mustering the crew (n = 801) followed by evasive maneuvers
(n = 667), increasing speed (n = 410) and electric perimeter fencing (n = 24). Multiple increase effort tactics were
used in only 8.3% of incidents (n = 408). Examining the
control variables, most attacks occurred between the
hours of 00:00 and 05:59 (n = 1,964; 48.6%). Incidents
were relatively evenly spread across the four quarters of
the year; 26.4% of incidents (n = 1,294) involved armed
pirates, and ships were attacked most often when stationary (n = 2,568; 53.2%) rather than steaming (n = 2,255;
46.8%). The number of pirates involved in an attack
ranged from 1 to 200, with a mean of 6.37 and standard
deviation of 7.13, suggesting wide variability across incidents. Tankers (29.4%) and bulk carriers (23.3%) were the
most frequently targeted vessel types.
Table 2 displays the frequency of pirate attacks across
continents. Attacks most frequently occurred in Africa
(38.7%) and Southeast Asia (33.2%). Overall, attacks were
nearly evenly split between successful (n = 2,404; 49.0%)
and unsuccessful (n = 2,351; 48.0%). However, variability did exist across continents. Africa exhibited the
highest proportion of unsuccessful attacks, with pirates
failing to hijack the ship and/or obtain proceeds in 59.3%
of incidents. The Far East exhibited the highest proportion of successful attacks, with pirates securing proceeds
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables

n

%

Yes (1)

2351

49.4

No (0)

2404

50.6

   0

2180

47.9

   1

1237

27.2

   2

1051

23.1

   3

87

1.9

   Yes (1)

1917

39.7

   No (0)

2913

60.3

   Yes (1)

1241

25.7

   No (0)

3589

74.3

   Yes (1)

307

6.4

   No (0)

4520

93.6

   Yes (1)

265

5.5

   No (0)

4565

94.5

   Yes (1)

206

4.3

   No (0)

4622

95.7

   0

3207

70.4

   1

939

20.6

   2

345

7.6

   3

62

1.4

   4

1

0.0

   Yes (1)

667

13.8

   No (0)

4161

86.2

   Yes (1)

801

16.5

   No (0)

4068

83.5

   Yes (1)

410

8.5

   No (0)

4414

91.5

   Yes (1)

24

0.5

   No (0)

4844

99.5

n

%

00:00–05:59

1964

48.6

06:00–11:59

680

16.8

12:00–17:59

533

13.2

Dependent variable: unsuccessful attack

Independent variables
Increase perceived risk variables
  Increased Risk Index

  Alarm raised

  Watchman present

  Anti-piracy watch

  Private security

  Increased lighting

Increase perceived effort variables
  Increased Effort Index

  Evasive maneuvers

  Crew mustered

  Vessel increase speed

  Electric perimeter fence

Control variables
Time
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Table 1 continued
Control variables

n

%

867

21.4

1 Qtr.

1194

24.4

2 Qtr.

1364

27.8

3 Qtr.

1146

23.4

4 Qtr.

1198

24.4

Yes (1)

1294

49.1

No (0)

1344

50.9

Stationary (0)

2568

53.2

At sail (1)

2255

46.8

Mean

6.37

na

Standard deviation

7.13

na

Min.

1

na

Max.

200

na

Tanker, bulk carrier, or container (1)

3401

69.4

Other vessel type (0)

1501

30.62

2000

469

9.6

2001

334

6.8

2002

370

7.6

2003

448

9.1

2004

335

6.8

2005

276

5.6

2006

239

4.9

2007

263

5.4

2008

295

6.0

2009

407

8.3

2010

458

9.3

2011

442

9.0

2012

301

6.1

2013

265

5.4

18:00–23:59
Quarter of the year

Weapons present

Vessel status

Number of pirates

Vessel type

Year

in 62.1% of incidents. A Pearson Chi square test found
that the frequency of successful and unsuccessful attacks
significantly varied across continents (χ2 = 168.03;
p. < 0.01) with a small effect (V = 0.19, Cohen 1988).d
This demonstrates that both the frequency and outcome
of piracy attacks differs across continents and points to
the need to test whether the global effect of SCP detected
by Shane and Magnuson (2014) is maintained within
each individual continent.
Analytic approach

This study addresses the research question Is the effect
of SCP techniques on piracy attacks consistent across

continents? The research hypothesis (H1) is that situational crime prevention techniques will be equally effective in preventing successful attacks across continents. To
explore this question, we conducted a series of mixedeffects logistic regression models to predict unsuccessful pirate attacks. Mixed-effects models allow “analytical
procedures to simultaneously incorporate individual and
group-level causal processes” (Johnson 2010, p. 621). This
is accomplished by modeling two different effects: individual level effects (level 1), with intercepts and slopes
describing the population as a whole, and group level
effects (level 2), with intercepts and slopes varying across
subgroups (Hamilton 2013; Johnson 2010). In the current
study, the individual level refers to the total population
of pirate attacks reported to the IMB (level 1) and the
group-level refers to the six continents represented in the
dataset (level 2). While simpler modeling procedures are
capable of accounting for clustering of cases within singular data sets (e.g. using robust standard errors adjusted
to each group within a standard regression model) such
approaches preclude examination of between-group differences (Johnson 2010, p. 628), which is the key aim of
this paper. The random effects model allows for the possibility that the occurrence of unsuccessful attacks, and
their significant predictors, differs across continents.
Such an analytical approach seems appropriate given the
patterns observed in Table 2. Collinearity diagnostics
showed no evidence of multicollinearity.e
First, a random-intercept model was run that allows
intercepts to vary across continents. With the random
intercepts accounted for in the calculation of the regression coefficients, the results report the populationwide effect of the predictor variables on the dependent
variable (Hamilton 2013, p. 394). To explore the effect
of the predictor variables across sub-sets of the population (e.g., continents) we conducted a series of random-intercept-and-slope models allowing the slopes
associated with each given SCP predictor variable to
vary across continents. A likelihood-ratio (LR) test then
measured whether the fit of the random-intercept-andslope model significantly improved upon that of the
random-intercept model. A significant finding (p < .05)
suggests that the predictor’s effect on the likelihood of
an unsuccessful attack differs significantly across continents. In such cases, the slope for each continent was
graphed to allow for visual inspection of the heterogeneous effect of the technique. This process was repeated
multiple times, once for each of the SCP variables in the
model.
We conducted two distinct sets of analyses in exploration of the research question. The first, which we refer to
as the “aggregate analysis,” incorporates the increased risk
and increased effort indices as predictor variables. This
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Table 2 Piracy attacks across continents
Continent

Successful attacks
(% of category)

Unsuccessful attacks
(% of category)

Unknown attack status
(% of category)

Total attacks
(% of total)

Americas

271 (56.8)

191 (40.0)

15 (3.1)

477 (9.7)

Africa

720 (38.0)

1124 (59.3)

52 (2.7)

1896 (38.7)
1627 (33.2)

South East Asia

901 (55.4)

681 (41.9)

45 (2.8)

Far East

182 (62.1)

95 (32.4)

16 (5.5)

293 (6.0)

Indian sub-continent

295 (54.8)

233 (43.3)

10 (1.9)

538 (11.0)

27 (40.3)

5 (7.5)

67 (1.4)

Rest of the world

35 (52.2)

Not reported

0 (0)

Total

2404 (49.0)

Pearson χ²

168.03

p

<.01

Cramer’s V

0.19

0 (0)
2351 (48.0)

4 (100.0)
147 (3.0)

4 (0.1)
4902 (100.00)

Sum of percentages does not equal exactly 100 % due to rounding. The Chi-square test was conducted on a 6 × 2 cross tabulation with continent of attack (Americas,
Africa, South East Asia, Far East, Indian sub-continent, Rest of the word) as the rows and attack status (successful or unsuccessful) as the columns

measured the effect the cumulative use of SCP had on the
occurrence of unsuccessful pirate attacks, and its variance
across continents. The second, termed the “disaggregate
analysis,” incorporated seven individual SCP techniques
as predictor variables: alarm raised, watchman present,
anti-piracy watch, private security, increased lighting,
evasive maneuvers, and crew mustered.f This extends the
aggregate analysis by exploring the effect of specific SCP
tactics, rather than SCP as a whole, and measuring their
heterogeneity across continents. In both the aggregate
and disaggregate models, the aforementioned control
variables were included.

Results
Table 3 displays the results of the aggregate logistic
regression models. Both the Increased Risk Index and
the Increased Effort Index were statistically significant
and associated with increased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack. For both increased risk (Exp[B] = 2.81)
and increased effort (Exp[B] = 2.66) odds ratios suggest
that for every additional tactic employed, the chance
for an unsuccessful attack increased over two-fold. Of
the control variables, both the 06:00–11:59 time period
(Exp[B] = 2.21), and attack status (Exp[B] = 2.19) were
significantly associated with an increased likelihood of
an unsuccessful attack. The presence of weapons was
associated with a significantly decreased likelihood of an
unsuccessful attack (Exp[B] = 0.27).
Table 4 displays the results of the aggregate likelihoodratio tests, which measures whether slopes of the SCP
index variables significantly differed across continents.
Results illustrate that, with respect to the Increased
Effort Index, the fit of the random intercept-and-slope
model was not superior to the random intercept model
(p = .10). This suggests that the effect of the Increased

Effort Index was relatively stable across continents. Conversely, results suggest that the fit of the random intercept-and-slope model was significantly better than the
intercept model in the case of the Increased Risk Index
(p = .01). This suggests that the effect of the Increased
Risk Index on unsuccessful attacks significantly varied
across continents.
Figure 1 presents the heterogeneity of the Increased
Risk Index and the odds ratios (Exp[B]) associated with
each continent.g In total, the Increased Risk Index was
associated with the increased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack on three continents: South East Asia, Far
East, and Rest of the World. Of these three, the effect was
largest in South East Asia, with each one-unit increase
in the index associated with a 56% greater likelihood of
an unsuccessful attack (Exp[B] = 1.56). Conversely, the
Increased Risk Index was associated with a decreased
likelihood of an unsuccessful attack in the Americas
(Exp[B] = 0.69), Africa (Exp[B] = 0.70), and the Indian
Sub-Continent (Exp[B] = 0.91).
Table 5 presents the results of the disaggregated logistic regression models. Four of the five SCP techniques
were significantly related to the increased likelihood of
an unsuccessful attack. Odds ratios ranged from 1.58 in
the case of crew mustered to 27.02 in the case of evasive
maneuvers. The only SCP technique that did not achieve
statistical significance was anti-piracy watch (p = .14),
though the odds ratio was in the expected direction
(Exp[B] = 1.45). Similar to the aggregate model, the time
frame of 06:00–11:59 (Exp[B] = 1.96) and attack status
(Exp[B] = 2.01) were statistically significant and associated with increased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack.
Weapons present (Exp[B] = 0.22) and number of pirates
(Exp[B] = 0.97) were associated with a decreased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack.
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Table 3 Aggregate SCP analysis: mixed-effect logistic regression (n=2638)
Variables

Odds ratio [Exp(B)]

SE

z

p

95% CI for Exp (B)
Lower

Upper

SCP indices
Increased risk

2.80

0.27

10.85

0.00

2.33

3.37

Increased effort

2.71

0.44

6.18

0.00

1.98

3.72

Controla
00:00–05:59

1.11

0.20

0.60

0.55

0.78

1.58

06:00–11:59

2.21

0.59

2.96

0.00

1.31

3.74

1.19

0.35

0.58

0.56

0.67

2.10

Weapons present

12:00–17:59

0.27

0.04

0.00

0.20

0.36

Vessel status

2.20

0.41

−8.76

0.00

1.54

3.16

Vessel type
1 Qtr.

0.98

0.16

1.44

0.30

2 Qtr.

0.99

0.20

3 Qtr.

0.95

0.20

4.30

−0.14

1.78

−0.06

−0.23

0.89

0.71

1.35

0.07

0.96

2.16

0.95

0.66

1.48

0.82

0.64

1.43

Number of pirates

0.97

0.17

0.09

0.94

1.00

Year

0.98

0.02

−1.04

0.30

0.94

1.02

Constant

1.44e+19

6.20e+20

1.02

0.31

2.90e−18

7.12e+55

Log likelihood

−594.69

−1.71

Model

Wald χ² (p)

245.91 (0.00)

The model assumes an unstructured covariance structure to account for the presence of correlation between the random slopes and random intercepts
Listwise deletion of cases
a

Reference category for time range controls is 18:00–23:59. Reference category for quarter controls is 4 Qtr.

Table 4 Aggregate likelihood-ratio (LR) tests: randomintercept vs. random-intercept-and-slope models
Model comparisona
Increased risk random intercept-and-slope
Increased effort random intercept-and-slope

LR χ²

p

9.89

0.01

19.62

0.00

a

The specified random intercept-and-slope models are compared to the
random intercept model

Table 6 displays the results of the disaggregate likelihood-ratio tests. The majority of techniques did not
achieve statistical significance. The lone exception was
alarm raised (p = .02), suggesting a heterogeneity effect
across continents. Figure 2 displays the odds ratios for
alarm raised across continents. While the effect of alarm
raised significantly differed, odds ratios were greater than
1 in each instance, showing that the technique was associated with an increased likelihood of an unsuccessful
attack within each continent. Odds ratios ranged from a
low of 1.90 in the case of the Americas to a high of 4.33 in
the case of South East Asia.

Discussion and policy implications
This study’s findings support the application of SCP techniques aimed at increasing the effort and risk to reduce

successful pirate attacks across continents. As discovered
in the aggregate analyses, both indices of increasing the
risk and increasing the effort were found to be effective
at reducing successful attacks on a global level. However,
some differences were found across continents. While
increasing the effort had the same effect at reducing
unsuccessful attacks across all regions, increasing the risk
varied in its effect across continents. Specifically, the use
of multiple Increased Risk tactics was associated with an
increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks in South East
Asia, Far East, and Rest of the World, and a decreased
likelihood in the Americas, Africa, and the Indian SubContinent. This suggests that the vulnerability of pirates
to cumulative SCP measures significantly differs across
continents.
The disaggregate analyses expanded on these results,
revealing that all the SCP techniques that increase risk,
except for anti-piracy watch, were associated with more
unsuccessful attacks. Furthermore, the effect of all but
one disaggregated tactic was consistent across continents. That lone tactic was alarm raised; however, alarm
raised odds ratios were above 1 for all continents, meaning that the continents differed in terms of the magnitude
of prevention, not whether prevention was achieved. This
indicates that the techniques of alarm raised, watchman
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Fig. 1 Exp(B) of Increased Risk Index across continents.

Table 5 Disaggregate SCP analysis: mixed-effect logistic regression (n=2638)
Variables

Odds ratio [Exp(B)]

SE

z

p

95% CI for Exp (B)
Lower

Upper

Increased risk
Alarm raised

4.33

0.74

8.60

0.00

3.10

6.04

Watchman present

1.84

0.30

3.72

0.00

1.33

2.53

Anti-piracy watch

1.24

0.31

0.85

0.40

0.75

2.03

Private security

9.23

3.85

5.33

0.00

4.07

20.90

Increased lighting

8.77

4.90

3.88

0.00

2.92

26.24

Increased effort
Evasive maneuvers

26.81

20.26

4.35

0.00

6.10

117.92

Crew mustered

1.76

0.32

3.11

0.00

1.23

2.52

Controla
00:00–05:59

1.04

0.18

0.22

0.83

0.74

1.47

06:00–11:59

2.01

0.53

2.64

0.01

1.20

3.38

12:00–17:59
Weapons present

0.99

0.29

0.24

0.04

−0.03

−9.31

0.98

0.55

1.77

0.00

0.18

0.33

Vessel status

2.05

0.38

3.87

0.00

1.42

2.95

Vessel type

0.94

0.15

−0.42

0.67

0.68

1.29

1 Qtr.

1.50

0.30

2.02

0.04

1.01

2.23

2 Qtr.

1.02

0.21

0.12

0.91

0.69

1.52

1.06

0.21

0.27

0.78

0.71

1.57

Number of pirates

3 Qtr.

0.97

0.02

0.06

0.94

1.00

Year

0.90

0.02

−1.91

−5.32

0.00

0.87

0.94

Constant

4.42e+88

1.70e+90

5.31

0.00

8.50e+55

2.3e+121

Log likelihood

−618.86

Model

Wald χ² (p)

269.59 (0.00)

The model assumes an unstructured covariance structure to account for the presence of correlation between the random slopes and random intercepts
Listwise deletion of cases
a

Reference category for time range controls is 18:00–23:59. Reference category for quarter controls is 4 Qtr
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Table 6 Disaggregate likelihood-ratio (LR) tests: randomintercept vs. random-intercept-and-slope models
Model comparisona

LR χ²

p

Alarm raised random intercept-and-slope

8.61

0.01

Watchman present random intercept-and-slope

0.70

0.40

Anti-piracy watch random intercept-and-slope

0.45

0.80

Private security random intercept-and-slope

1.59

0.45
0.98

Increased lighting random intercept-and-slope

0.04

Evasive maneuvers random intercept-and-slope

1.52

.47

Crew mustered random intercept-and-slope

2.95

.23

a

The specified random intercept-and-slope models are compared to the
random intercept model

present, private security, and increased lighting can and
should be applied in all regions to prevent successful
attacks.
Overall, the findings lend support to the SCP notion
regarding the importance of being crime-specific when
formulating and implementing possible measures aimed
at preventing and disrupting crime (Clarke 2013). As
detailed in the literature review, piracy varies in form
depending on the region. Thus, some SCP techniques
may have a larger positive effect at reducing attacks in
certain regions than others. For example, raising the
alarm had a larger effect in South East Asia compared
to the other regions, indicating that this technique may
need to be emphasized and utilized more in South East
Asia than in other regions. Perhaps pirates in South East
Asia are more threatened by a ship’s alarm given the fact
that they tend to operate closer to shore (Von Hoesslin
2012) and are usually armed with knives or crowbars
instead of guns (Nincic 2009; Sullivan 2010). This may
make them feel more susceptible to being apprehended
when an alarm sounds.
Perhaps the most important policy implication is that
despite the pirates’ personal position or whether they are

armed, the prospect of an unsuccessful attack is more
likely when layers of increase effort measures are implemented. These measures have added importance when
vessels are at anchor or in port, where guardianship may
be lower due to over-extended or corrupt police forces
and the realities associated with failed or weak states’
ability to provide protection. The findings also imply that
shipping vessels do not necessarily have to arm themselves, which may escalate an attack, nor rely on government to protect them while at sea. What makes SCP so
appealing is that shipping companies can become more
self-reliant and avoid implementation issues associated
with multiple agencies.
However, we also acknowledge the somewhat paradoxical relationship between the findings of the aggregate and disaggregate analyses, specifically with regards
to the increased risk index. The disaggregate analysis
found that each individual SCP technique significantly
increased the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks on a
global level. Across continents, alarm raised differently
impacted piracy, but was associated with increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks in each instance. Therefore, while some heterogeneity was evident with this
technique, it can be classified as an effective crime control tactic in each instance. A different picture emerged
when we analyzed the use of multiple techniques in the
aggregate analysis, via the increased effort and increased
risk indices. While both increased effort and increased
risk were associated with increased likelihood of unsuccessful attacks on a global level, the increased risk index
was associated with unsuccessful attacks in only 3 of the
6 continents included in this study (South East Asia, Far
East, an Rest of the World). In the Americas, Africa, and
Indian Sub-Continent, the increased risk index was actually associated with a decreased likelihood of an unsuccessful attack. This implies an interesting relationship
between the different SCP techniques as they relate to
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piracy. In particular, while each individual tactic on its
own increases the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks, the
combination of various tactics does not always work as
intended. Future research should aim to better understand the combination of tactics that best prevent piracy
attacks. Indeed, Bryant et al. (2014) recently found that
the use of Watch Keeping and Enhanced Vigilance (WK
and EV) in addition with other tactics was more effective than any combination of tactics absent WK and EV.
Future research should continue to explore these issues.

Limitations and directions for future research
Limitations

Reporting piracy to the IMB is voluntary so there may be
some measure of underreporting due to potential insurance costs, image and reputation of the shipping company and heightened perception of risk among shipping
clientele. Counting piracy incidents depends on the definition; different definitions do exist such those offered
by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Article 15) and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Article 101), which may not
include theft so the full extent of piracy and economic
losses may not be fully captured. The data published by
the IMB in their annual report are summary data and
may also contain errors due to collection and reporting processes (Jacob 1984). Some of this was evident in
the yearly data, which is why data before 2000 was not
included. The SCP principles may also suffer from “…
unavoidable overlap among categories” (Clarke 1997, p.
17), which may introduce a degree of measurement error.
In addition, the analysis did not account for characteristics of the crew operating the under-attack vessels, which
may be related to the likelihood of unsuccessful attacks.
Certain ship crews may be more experienced in combating piracy, and may more effectively incorporate SCP
techniques. Therefore, crew-specific variables may have
an interaction effect with certain SCP tactics and may
alter the findings of the analysis if measured.
Directions for future research

Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the
literature on piracy prevention by illustrating how different SCP tactics, and magnitudes of tactics, perform
against piracy on both a global and continental level.
Future research can expand on these findings and explore
whether the effectiveness of the SCP measures vary at the
country level. In addition, future studies can test how the
techniques relating to increasing the risk and increasing
the effort vary depending on particular attack characteristics, such as the type of piracy involved (e.g., opportunistic theft vs. ransom) as well as the type of pirate
weapons present (e.g., lack of weapons, firearms, knives).
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At a basic level, opportunity is present in all crimes and
facilitated by illicit opportunity structures and exploited
by weaknesses in social control. Theories of crime and
criminality from other disciplines such as political science and international relations can provide a framework
of the social and environmental processes that promote
and sustain piracy on land.

Conclusion
Overall, the theory is supported. When measures to
increase risk and effort are applied, there is a statistically significant increase in unsuccessful pirate attacks,
after controlling for other influences. For each additional
tactic employed that increases risk or increases effort,
there is an increase of more than twofold for unsuccessful attacks. In general, the findings imply that SCP can be
applied on the water, where help is not readily available.
The measures can be applied without resorting to firearms, which may only escalate an encounter with pirates.
The SCP measures identified here can be incorporated
into the planning and operational practices of the shipping industry for ship operators and masters transiting
high-risk waters worldwide.
Endnotes
a
A safe room is a fortified space aboard a ship designed
to protect the crew if pirates board the vessel.
b
https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre.
c
Shane and Magnuson (2014) conceptualized Crew
Mustered as the lone Reduce the Anticipated Rewards
measure in their study. We re-conceptualized this measure as part of the Increase Effort category so that it better
fit with the other variables and research question. While
this approach differed from Shane & Magnuson’s, it still
strongly adheres to the SCP principles. For one, having
to breach a fortified room to take a crew hostage indeed
increases the required effort for obtaining a ransom.
Also, the differing approaches reflect the unavoidable
overlap inherent in the opportunity-reducing techniques
of SCP (Clarke 1997, p. 17).
d
STATA version 13 was used to conduct all statistical
analyses for this study.
e
A Tolerance value of .01 or less generally indicates the
presence of multicollinearity. Tolerance scores ranged
from .623 to .990. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
score is the reciprocal of Tolerance and VIF scores that
exceed 10 indicate multicollinearity. VIF scores range
from 1.01 to 1.61 (Meyers et al. 2006, p. 212).
f
Two of the disaggregated SCP variables, Increase
Speed and Electric Perimeter Fence were excluded from
the disaggregated models because the models failed to
converge when these variables were included as random
effects, due to a lack of variance across continents. Given
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this observed lack of variance, the variables were dropped
from the model (Hamilton 2013, p. 404).
g
The exponential of the slope (Exp[B]) rather than the
slope (B) is presented to allow for easy comparison with
the logistic regression model findings.
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